On 11 September 2012 over a
million people took to the streets of Barcelona in a huge demonstration in
favour of independence from Spain.
Just two weeks later, building on
the impetus for self-government, the Catalan President Artur Mas brought
forward regional elections by two years, pledging to hold an early referendum
on Catalunya's political status and possible independence.
Shortly after in October, in the
Basque Country, two separatist parties dominated the elections to the Basque
Parliament by winning two thirds of the seats.
Facing the constitutional crisis
of a possible breakaway of two of its Regional Autonomies, Spain waited with
apprehension. The sabre-rattling ripostes and political condemnation were not
long in coming:
- Ex-Army officer, Colonel Alaman
publicly calls for military intervention in Catalunya;
- In a counter demonstration
against independence for Barcelona, right arms are seen raised in the classic
Fascist salute;
- In late November in the editorial of the official Army Magazine
'Ejercito', General Pontifas Deus denounces President Mas for his 'more than
outrageous plans for self-government';
- In Brussels, Spain's Partido Popular
Minister of Defence denies any knowledge of any 'Movement' in the Military, or
any use of the Military as a mouthpiece for others;
- There are calls for the arrest of
President Mas, possibly for treason.
With hindsight perhaps there was
an over-reaction to the crisis. But for the Right and many traditionalists in
the country, the unity of Spain is sacrosanct. Even today.
This concept of a united Spain
has long been a challenge for Catalans, especially those whose language and
family roots are Catalan. They have an intense sense of pride in their
Catalanism, which combines within it an almost spiritual love of their language
and culture and historical identity, within Spain but not necessarily of it.
Catalans feel different, and in their history there is much to confirm this.
Having been settled firstly by
the Greeks, Catalunya became the most completely romanized region of Iberia and
had the least contact - at most 80 years - with the Moors during the seven
centuries of Moorish occupation of the majority of the peninsula. From the
12th to the 14th centuries, Catalans, in a sophisticated confederacy
with the Aragonese, dominated large parts of the Mediterranean, ruling
Sardinia, Corsica and most of present-day Greece, and controlling the gold
trade with Sudan.
But one of the most surprising
aspects of this empire was the political and administrative structure that
supported it. From the early 13th century Catalunya had a three-chamber
form of parliament, the Corts, which passed all legislation and the Generalitat,
which organised tax raising and expenditure. It was a very good time to be
Catalan. When Queen Isabella in the beginning of the 16th century banned
the Catalans from trading with the New World of the Americas, domination by
Spain or the Central Government was to become their destiny for the next five
centuries.
Every country has an event or
events in its past which by repetition over the years form an emotive part of
their historical identity and the date is familiar to all. For the English,
1066, the Battle of Hastings and the start of the Norman Conquest is the one we
remember. For the Catalans it is 11 September 1741, during the War of Spanish
Succession. After a year's siege Barcelona was finally captured by the French
and Spanish armies who raised a third of the city to the ground. The 11 September is now the National Day of Catalunya and was also the date of
Barcelona's latest demonstration for Independence from Spain.
But is it possible that what
might most colour Catalunya's view of their relationship with Madrid are events
in the 20th century, still within living memory of older citizens? In
1939, the final defeat of the Republican Government by Franco's Nationalist troops
took place in Barcelona. It was effectively the end of the Civil War. The
campaign against the Catalan language culture and people unleashed on Franco's
victory was devastating. Any public use of the language was banned and any
books in Catalan including priceless and irreplaceable private collections were
destroyed. Street and town names were given Spanish names. Catalan went
underground.
This discrimination damaged the
language but what caused far more linguistic damage longterm were the 'tidal
waves' of Spanish-speaking immigrants, mainly from Andalucia and mostly
semi-literate: a quarter of a million in the forties, half a million in the
fifties, and almost a million in the sixties. Absorption into the local
population as had happened with previous immigrants was almost impossible as
the new immigrants often lived in their own 'barrios' speaking Spanish which
was also the language used in education. Spanish increasingly became the
language of preference for domestic use, even in Catalan homes. Figures for 1975
show that Catalan was spoken in only 39% of homes in Barcelona.
So do these figures have any
relevance in 2012? To some extent certainly. Girona's mayor, Carles Puigdemont
identifies the original source of the desire for separatism: "We have our
own language, our own culture, it's in our DNA." he might have been
heartened to see flags of Andalucia among the Catalan pro-separatist flags
fluttering from the balconies. Other pro-separatist politicians, seeing the
huge increase in the movement of workers following the EU open border policy,
must be asking themselves how this is affecting voting patterns. Without the
DNA will those recent citizens be ready to take the risk of supporting
Independence?
Carme Chacon, a Catalan, a
dynamic politician and former Defence Minister in Zapatero's Socialist
Government, sees it from a broader perspective. She favours the concept of
smaller states within a Federal Europe, "different but united." She sees herself as one of the many
Catalans who have roots in other regions of Spain. Her father came to the north
from Andalucia and her grandfather was an anarchist from Aragon. She declares
"I am a Catalan, a Spaniard and a European. And I do not want anyone to
oblige me to choose."
If her views are shared by many in
Catalunya, could it be that Catalanism or cultural identity is not what has
provoked this present independista crisis? It is certainly underpinning it, but as Bill Clinton said,
in another place and at another time, "It's the Economy, stupid."
It is difficult to believe, on the
face of it, that this could be the case with Catalunya. Its reputation as the
powerhouse of Spain for its industrial and commercial success, are supported by
the statistics. It provides 20% of Spain's GDP, 25% of Spain's tax revenue, 35%
of Spain's exports including 45% of high-tech exports, and 25% of Spain's tax
revenue (2009 figures). In spite of this, Catalunya is €42 billion in debt. And
the root cause of this situation lies in Catalunya's political State of
Autonomy and its fiscal relationship with Madrid.
For Spain, though composed politically
of regions with autonomy, has a centralised tax collection system. It was
formulated in 1978 in the difficult days of Spain's fledgling democracy which
followed 40 years of repressive dictatorship under General Franco, after the
Civil War in the late 1930s. Only
the Basque Country and Navarre were allowed to raise their own taxes, a
traditional right with its roots in the fueros of medieval times.
Put rather simplistically, Madrid
levies the taxes and returns to each autonomy a percentage in services and
investment. The difference between these two sums is the fiscal deficit. In the
case of Catalunya, Madrid raises 95% of the taxes, and Catalunya raises 5% to
cover its Social Services, including Healthcare and Education. Figures from the Generalitat show that
between 1986 and 2009 the fiscal deficit ran on average at 8% of GDP per annum and
in that last year Catalunya contributed €16.4 billion (8.4% of GDP) more in taxes
than it received from Madrid in state services and investment. Alternatively
one could say that amongst the autonomies, Catalunya was the third highest
contributor of taxes to central government, but was eleventh highest in what it
received back from Madrid.
To put into perspective the
damage this causes to the Catalan economy, the Cercle Catala de Negocis has
cited a telling analogy: Japan's Tsunami Disaster caused an estimated loss of
3.6% - 5.7% of its GDP.
The strain that the increase in
the fiscal deficit has placed on relations between Madrid and Catalunya was
exacerbated by the sense of anger and betrayal felt by the Catalans over the
fate of their new Statute of Autonomy of 2006. After four years of
negotiations, this had been approved by the Catalan Parliament in September
2005, by the Spanish Congress in March 2006 and ratified in Catalunya by a
majority vote in a referendum. It gave Catalunya extensions of rights in the
Judicial system, Catalan language status, immigration controls, taxes and
access to loans, and the right for Catalunya to be referred to as a nation.
The frustration felt then when an appeal to the Spanish
Constitutional Court was filed by the conservative Partido Popular party was as nothing compared to
the severe shock delivered by the Court's ruling in 2010 when the appeal was
upheld. Fourteen articles of the Statute had been abolished and twenty-six were
to be seriously amended: these changes struck at the very structure of civil,
political and judicial administration in Catalunya. And as for the Autonomy's
right to Nation status? It was deemed unconstitutional. For Catalans, this was insult added to
injury.
Of course many in Central
Government and in the rest of Spain have a different perspective on the Catalan
position. Barcelona is seen as an avant-garde, vibrant city rich in Art and
Culture with a thriving port. As an autonomy, it is able to take advantage, as a
gateway to Europe, of its geographical location on Spain's north-east
Mediterranean coast, sharing a border with France. It is famous for its
tourism, but respected and somewhat envied for its highly successful commercial
and industrial sectors especially textiles, biotechnology - and wine
production. Whereas other Spanish
autonomies with much lower GDPs, perhaps traditionally more rural and sometimes
disastrously less well developed, have not only seen their budgets shredded,
social programmes slashed, mounting redundancies in local government and
private sectors, and rocketing unemployment especially among the young, all
causing real poverty. Many therefore are tempted to see Catalans as 'spoilt
children' trying to hold onto their 'goodies', exploiting their role as
perennial victims of the wicked Central Government. Madrid seems to see its
present fiscal policy towards Catalunya, however contentious, as trying to
maintain the 1978 concept of regional autonomies, offering them 'cafe para
todos'. This tends to be seen then (amongst other less altruistic motives) as
an opportunity for radical wealth redistribution in favour of poorer regions of
Spain, especially in the light of the euro crisis and diminishing EU funding.
But the Catalans are also
suffering. With their lack of
fiscal control, faltering GDP and high tax rates, including the highest income tax
rate of 56%, they share increasingly with other autonomies and European
countries many of the problems referred to above.
So was the constitutional crisis
all media hype?
The regional elections on 25 November took place with no military coup, but also without the President Artur
Mas winning the outright majority he needed for his party, the CiU, to call for
a referendum. Even worse, voters' support for the CiU dropped 8%, and their
representation in the 135-seat parliament dropped from 62 seats to 50. They are
still the largest party, but only in coalition can they function.
An anti-climax perhaps? Not
necessarily if one examines the voting pattern. Naturally enough the Partido
Popular leader Mariano Rajoy with schadenfreude was predictably scathing in his
judgement of the Catalan President - perhaps he wished to divert attention from
two very unpalatable facts. Firstly that just under two thirds (87) of parliamentary seats
are now held between four parties who either support at least a referendum on
independence or those who openly campaigned on a more radical independista
policy, such as Oriol Junqueras. He is leader of the party Esquerra Republicana
Catalunya (ERC) which doubled their seats at the elections to become the second
largest party. The high turnout of voters, 68%, more than two thirds of
eligible voters, confirms the strength of the wish for constitutional change, which
many political commentators feel Madrid should not ignore.
However, instead of compromise,
Madrid appears to favour the policy of attack being the best form of defence. The Minister for Education, José Ignacio
Wert, is advocating much of Michael Gove's proposals for English education: league tables, privatisation, etc. But what has caused enormous offence to
Catalunya is his attack on bilingual education policy, downgrading the status
and use of Catalan to a specialist subject, and conversely defining Spanish as
the main language of education.
Opposition is widespread and
strong: 71% against in a December poll, but the most scathing appraisal is the
article by internationally renowned Fernando Vallespin (Professor of Political
Science and Administration and Director of Political Theory at Madrid's
Universidad Autonoma) in El Pais on 7 December 2012. He says:
"Faced with the state of the current situation in Catalunya, what could be more rash than to aggravate them on the question they are most sensitive about, the defence of their language...What it shows is that (Madrid) has not bothered to find out absolutely anything about what is happening there, nor has it understood the basic message coming from the ballot box."
[Spanish original: "Ante la situación que estamos viviendo en Cataluña, ¿cabe algo más imprudente que tocarles en el punto más sensible, la defensa de su lengua?...Significa no haberse enterado de nada de cuanto está ocurriendo allí, ni haber entendido el mensaje fundamental emanado de las urnas."]
He also urges that party politics should be put
aside…this circumstance demands a renewal of the constitutional agreement,
seeking those outside politics who are capable of generating the maximum
possible consensus. He concludes with these words:
"The Government is far too arrogant and doctrinaire and it lacks the will and ability to encourage efforts to be made towards a grand State plan. It has chosen the opposite option and we shall all pay the price."
[Spanish original: "Al Gobierno le sobra soberbia y doctrinarismo y le faltan la voluntad y la capacidad para adicionar fuerzas en torno a un gran proyecto de Estado. Ha elegido la opción contraria y lo pagaremos todos."]
He is the expert, but will they listen to him.
So will Catalunya pull back from
the brink? Perhaps if Malta and Estonia can pull off being small independent
countries in the EU, this ancient Catalan region will be encouraged to take that leap to escape
their present near-impossible relationship with Madrid and Spain.
But Brussels has just confirmed
that Scotland's exit from the United Kingdom would mean also giving up its EU
membership. To renegotiate entry could be long and costly. Catalans have a
reputation for being financially canny and having great common sense - an
honourable compromise may yet be reached. For the whole is often worth more
than the sum of its parts. Good Luck, Spain.
by Sheila Profit